Negotiating the boundaries of news reporting
Journalists’ strategies to access and report political information in China

Abstract
As Chinese politicians hold the power to control the dissemination of political information, beat journalists must guard their relationship with the authorities to expand the boundaries of news reporting; that is, to gain more access to political information and report more sensitive news. What remains a puzzle is how beat journalists can possibly expand these boundaries. Data from participatory observation and in-depth interviews with journalists reveal that in order to gain more access to political information, they not only serve as political advocates but also seize the opportunity to act as watchdogs. To report more sensitive news without being sanctioned or denounced by the authorities, they coordinate with peers both within and outside the news organization.

Introduction
Journalists are not fully autonomous when reporting the news; they are influenced by other actors, including media owners, advertisers, audiences, interest groups and politicians (McManus, 1994; Reese, 2001). Politicians shape how journalists report political news to a greater extent than other actors (Habermas, 2006). But it is debatable whether politicians or journalists have the stronger impact on the reporting of political news. In Western democracies, the politician–journalist relationship resembles a “tango” in which either party could take the lead (Gans, 1979, 2003).
	As for China, many would believe that politicians dominate the production of political news. Media censorship is known to be strong and pervasive, with all news organizations requested to follow the party propaganda guidelines (Hao et al., 1998; Brady, 2008; He, 2008). In this context, the journalist–politician relationship can hardly be regarded as a “tango”; “puppet show” might be a more appropriate metaphor. But concluding that Chinese journalists have no autonomy at all in political news reporting is somewhat subjective. For instance, the commercial pressure on news organizations has driven journalists to expand the boundaries of news reporting, which indicates the maximized space of political news reporting in China against political and social control (Lu, 2005; Zhang, 2008). 
	By political control, we refer here to the concrete control exercised by propaganda authorities when they send notices to the newsroom to define the reporting boundaries of a particular news issue (Lu, 2005). Social control, on the other hand, is defined as government officials’ control over journalists, whom they treat differently in accordance with the social relationship between the two parties. As opposed to their Western counterparts, Chinese governmental officials, who are synonymous with politicians due to the one-party political system, hold the power to decide whether or not to release news information to the media, how much they want to reveal, which news organizations they prefer to use, and whether or not they will request that the propaganda authority punish any journalists who have published negative news about them. 
	But being both politically and socially controlled does not necessarily mean that the journalists are solely at the mercy of the politicians; the latter also need the journalists to disseminate their propaganda. Having positive news published and silencing negative news is one of the keys for politicians to move upwards on the career ladder. 
	Journalists therefore have some power to bargain with politicians for expanded reporting boundaries. An important and interesting question is how journalists can raise the stakes in negotiations with politicians. With empirical data from participatory observation in a commercial newspaper in China and interviews with the newspaper’s journalists, this paper explores the strategies used by Chinese beat journalists to expand the news reporting boundaries for political issues. 

Journalist–politician relations and news reporting
Journalists and politicians in Western democracies are mutually dependent, although with different professional objectives (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). In this symbiotic relationship, politicians require the publicity and visibility that journalists can provide, while journalists need high-level access to politicians for political information (Sigal, 1973; McManus, 1994; Davis, 2009). Consequently, an ongoing “tug of war” or “tango” takes place, the control shifting from the one side to the other (Gans, 1979). This is reflected in the reporting of the news, which fluctuates between being more compliant and more critical of the politicians (Davis, 2009).
	The question drawing the most attention is which side is leading this “tango”. Gans (1979, 2003) and Davis (2000) find that it is the politicians, while Strömbäck and Nord (2006, p.147) conclude that “it is the journalists not their political sources that lead the tango most of the time”.
	According to Gans (2003, p.46), American journalists report “what the sources tell them”, such that they tend to index the range of political views to the presence of mainstream government actors who share those views (Bennett 2003, p.125). Likewise, Davis (2000) found that the British media are becoming increasingly dependent on information supplied by external sources due to tighter editorial budgets. In the Netherlands, journalists are less likely to follow politicians, yet politicians tend to prevail, as they very often seem to succeed in getting media attention and coverage (Brants et al., 2010, p.37).
	In Sweden, however, journalists sometimes have control over the media agenda, depending on the power of the politician they are facing and the news organization they serve. And when it comes to the framing and content of news stories, they have absolute dominance (Strömback and Nord 2006, pp.148–9). These findings compare with those of Reich (2006) and Eriksson and Östman (2013), both of whom suggest that the journalists gain more autonomy in the later phases of the news production process. 
	The power balance between politicians and journalists on the media agenda differing from one news organization to another is also seen in the US. American national news outlets such as The New York Times and ABC News lead political activities more often than they follow them, while most local news outlets tend to follow the lead of politicians (Bartels, 1996); that is, they “index” news coverage (Bennett, 2003). 

Journalist–politician relations and the news reporting boundary in China
The above summary of the research on journalist–politician relations shows that there is no conclusive answer as to who leads the dance in democratic settings. In non-democracies, we would expect the answer to be more definite. In China, in particular, politicians and the government predominantly control news reporting. While Western journalists are secured a comparatively higher level of access to politicians and government by law (Larsson, 2002), Chinese journalists must find political sources that are less obligated to be transparent.
	Chinese politicians not only hold the power to control the dissemination of information, they are also able to retaliate against journalists after the latter have published negative news about them. Such retaliation can include blacklisting journalists from attending regular events for news information or even asking the propaganda authority to dismiss the journalist or their supervisors (Bennett, 2010).
	In this sense, one might conclude that the journalist–politician relationship is more like a “puppet show” than a “tango”. But studies show that Chinese journalists are not that passive. Not only do they attempt to report sensitive news before the arrival of the propaganda notices from the communication authority, they also try to “play with the edge” of the political bans (Kuang, 2012). This is possible as a result of the media commercialization supported by the party state, which must loosen the strings on the news organizations so that the latter can win market share in order to avoid growing dependent on state financial support (Wu, 2000). Yet it is out of the question for the Chinese news organizations to gain as much autonomy as their counterparts in the West. Despite the economic reforms, the Chinese media system is only moving from totalitarianism to market authoritarianism (Winfield and Peng, 2005). The journalist–politician relationship is therefore definitely not a tango, but neither is it a puppet show.
	Journalists seem to know the boundaries of news reporting, which vary for different news issues. For issues referring to basic state policies, for instance Tibet and family planning, the boundary is fixed. For issues considered too sensitive and already having triggered bans from the propaganda authorities, which send notices to the newsroom on an event-by-event basis, the freedom to report is diminished to nothing (Zhang, 2008). For the other issues, which offend neither state policies nor propaganda disciplines, the boundaries are elastic and journalists try to stretch them. 
	Attempts at expanding news reporting boundaries are spurred by both organizational-level and individual-level pressures. First, as most Chinese news organizations are now commercial, journalists are encouraged to report on the news that attracts the largest audience (Zhao, 2000, p.584). In a politically controlled environment, the sensitive news that is not favorable to politicians is generally the most attractive to the public. Secondly, journalists have numerous motivations to expand the boundaries: to produce more news reports to fulfill their workload, to write good news, to make themselves competitive among their peers and to act professionally to meet their dreams. 
	Expanding the boundaries of news reporting is also made possible by the fact that politicians require positive news about themselves and the government units they are leading. The dependence of them on commercial news organizations to spread propaganda is expected to increase as the commercialized media become more popular.

Expanding news reporting boundaries in China
Maintaining and improving social relationships with politicians thus becomes key for journalists to expand the boundaries of news reporting by gaining more access to political information and publishing more sensitive news.

Gaining more access to political information
News source–journalist relations have a substantial impact on news production, as the sources influence the reporting content (Gassaway, 1988; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). Firstly, there is much information that “travels outside authorized, prescribed channels”. Whether or not it is obtained and made into news depends on the source-journalist relations (Gassaway, 1998). Politicians as the source of political information hold the power to prevent some of the information from being released to the news media (Davis, 2000). Even when journalists have access to the source, how much they can get from the source partly depends on the relations between the two (ibid).
	The situation in China is believed to be worse due to the fact that politicians have fewer obligations and incentives to report to the citizens through the news media. This power imbalance has resulted in Chinese journalists seeing themselves more as being an opportunist facilitator, conveying positive aspects of government policies and leadership images, than a detached watchdog (Weaver, 1998). In the West, journalists seldom report on the achievements of politicians, which they generally consider to be non-news (Brants et al., 2010); in China, journalists have to do so.
	Consequently, Chinese journalists have to put greater effort into maintaining relations with politicians than Western journalists so as to have access to the information they are supposed to acquire. Without these relations, journalists would never gain access to the regular press releases of the authorities, not to mention any exclusive information from them (Lu, 2005). 
	Despite its importance, not many studies have specifically examined how journalists can increase access to political information. Among the few, Pan (2000, pp.83–90) found that Chinese journalists would write advertorial content and accept paid journalism, which brings them into a network providing them with the access to and verification of the news information required for their reporting. Such paid journalism stands in sharp contrast to the professional standards of journalism according to which journalists shall serve the public, not the government and public officials.

Publishing more sensitive news
As the Chinese news media are becoming more commercialized, journalists have been pressed to cover more sensitive news to attract audiences and readers. Politically sensitive news is primarily revealed by anonymous sources within the system, although in some cases also by journalists themselves or external journalists, which were unable to publish the news due to organizational policies (Zhang, 2008).
	Maintaining the relations with government officials also becomes key to getting access to sensitive news. Even more challenging for journalists is to publish the sensitive news without being denounced or sanctioned by related authorities. 
	Some studies have scrutinized how Chinese investigative journalists do sensitive reporting. Tong (2007), for example, summarized five “guerrilla reporting tactics” used by Chinese investigative journalists when reporting politically sensitive news in order to avoid sanctions yet meeting their professional calling. These tactics include choosing the theme or aspects of an issue that would not breach the bottom line of the Communist Party, making political comment in the guise of constructive criticism, writing objectively, quoting sources that are acceptable to officials and obtaining interviews by misrepresenting themselves. Zhang (2008) also found that investigative journalists would try to stretch the boundaries of reporting by studying the news bans to make “strategic breakthroughs” without stepping into political mine fields. Journalists have also been known to cooperate with peers from other news organizations in order to co-share the political risks. 
	Used by investigative journalists, however, these tactics may not be relevant for the majority, the beat reporters. This is because beat reporters, who constantly rely on the related authorities for information, must consider whether their reporting would be detrimental to their relations with the politicians. This is why it is so necessary to carry out research on how beat reporters deal with politically sensitive issues.

Research questions
This paper seeks to answer a question which receives little concern from academic circles despite its significance: How do beat journalists push the limits when reporting on political issues in China? In this context, news reporting boundaries are defined as the maximized limit of political news reporting, which can be expanded, depending on the ability of news reporters to gain more access to political information and publish more sensitive news despite the political and social controls imposed by Chinese authorities and politicians. 
	Two sub-questions are thus raised: 1) What strategies are applied by beat journalists to gain more access to political information? 2) What strategies are applied by beat journalists to publish more sensitive news without being denounced or sanctioned by the authorities?

Methods and data
The data mainly comes from participatory observation at a Chinese newspaper. By working for three months as an intern at the Local News Division (LND) of Paper S, a province-level nonparty newspaper, the author was able to record the whole process of how journalists communicate with local authorities, go about their reporting and write news reports. Both on-site and follow-up interviews were done with six journalists (four senior, two junior) at Paper S. A seminar organized by the LND of Paper S on reporting tactics and maintaining relationships with local authorities was also recorded. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, both the newspaper and journalists interviewed are kept anonymous.
	Making Paper S the entry to the field is based on both theoretical and practical considerations. As a commercialized, nonparty news organization which is not taken as the official outlet for the authority, journalists at the newspaper must invest greater effort than their party counterparts into improving or maintaining their relationships with government officials, which makes the paper a good point for observing the strategies to push the limits for news reporting. It was also easier for the author to access Paper S, as the author has a personal connection there, which is essential for data collection in China. 
	In fact, even with connections, the author could not secure permission to enter the newsroom. The status of the author as a Chinese national working for a foreign university prevented him from working as a registered researcher at Paper S. An application made by the author, sponsored by a page editor and sent to the human resources department at Paper S was rejected. Surprised by the restrictive policy with respect to taking external observers, the page editor finally worked out a solution by making the author an unregistered intern serving as an assistant to a senior journalist at the LND.
	Despite the author was not registered at Paper S, many journalists at the LND were well aware of the author’s position as an intern and a researcher. Nevertheless, the unregistered position prevented him from openly asking for an opportunity to follow other journalists whenever the senior journalist in question was not allowed to take an unregistered intern with her. But the journalist was able to introduce him to five other journalists with whom she had worked closely in the past. 
            Taking participatory observation as an approach to collect data has both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, by actively taking part in the routine work in the newsroom, the author had the opportunity to observe more. Moreover, only if the author was part of the newsroom could the journalists there be more open to his questions. On the other hand, the researcher’s values and personalities would have an influence on the objectiveness of the data from observations. Besides, some journalists might not feel comfortable when they realized that there was an observer. To compensate, the author made references to the literature on newsroom practices to verify the points of observation from time to time. Moreover, he made efforts to reduce the awareness of the journalists that he was observing them, e.g. by offering help and working with them.
            The author also used the data from observation to verify the reliability of the data from interviews. To protect interviewees from any potential deprivations, the author had to keep both the newspaper and individual journalists anonymous. When this might undermine the perceived creditability of the interesting data, the author has tried to make the data collection process as transparent as possible to reduce the negative effects of anonymization. 
Although the number of interviewees is only six, the data is unique considering the difficulty of obtaining access to Chinese newsrooms and journalists. This interview data also serves to verify the data obtained via observation.
	Major questions for the interviewees include their descriptions of their relations with the related government departments and officials, the influence of such relations to their reporting, how they acquire news information and handle negative news, and their opinions on the essentials of being an excellent beat reporter in China. Follow-up questions were raised when the beat journalists referred to interesting circumstances. 
	Interview transcriptions and field notes were analyzed with reference to the four stages of the coding process described by Bryman (2008). In the first step, some major categories were produced and text segments were subsumed to these category themes following a thorough examination of the data. Next, the text segments under these categories were again examined and marked with specific codes. In the next step, the texts were systematically marked with the produced codes or new codes. These codes were reviewed, compared and integrated once they were found similar. In the last step, the reduced codes were analyzed to find the interconnections between them with reference to the existing research findings and the research questions.

Results
Beat journalists confirm that maintaining a good relationship with the authorities is essential to beat reporting. They have different opinions as to how close the relationship should be, but the bottom line is that journalists cannot be ignored, resisted or rejected when the authorities have information to release. 
To push the limits for reporting the news, beat journalists must develop effective strategies. This section presents the two major strategies pursued by beat journalists to gain more access to news information, including “serving as political advocates” and “seizing the opportunities to be watchdogs” before elaborating on the strategy for publishing more sensitive news published without being punished, namely “coordinating with both internal and external journalists”. 

Access strategies
Getting access to news information from the Chinese authorities is far more complicated than a Western journalist can imagine. Maintaining a regular relationship with the related party and government departments is not enough; journalists have to “serve as political advocates” and “seize the opportunities to be watchdogs”.

Serving as political advocates. Journalists at Paper S are proud of being part of the newspaper, renowned for its “professionalism” in reporting negative news. Being well aware of the politicians’ power to hold political information, however, the journalists also work to please the politicians whenever they are in need of propaganda so that they can trade propaganda for more access to the news information released by the authorities. 
	Journalists did not deny working as “opportunistic facilitators”. One experienced journalist told his colleagues in an internal seminar at Paper S that repeatedly writing positive news about a politician could help them gain the politician’s trust, which can subsequently provide opportunities for exclusive interviews and being picked to ask questions at press conferences. Another journalist pointed out how, “When the politicians want you to put feathers in their cap, you should do it nicely to make them happy so that they think of you whenever they need to do communication campaigns”. 
	Some journalists put special effort into attracting the attention of the high-ranking officials in their beat. One way of doing this was to prime whatever the high-ranking officials said, even if other officials appearing in the same event had offered something more interesting. Some journalists went so far as to collect the news stories they had written on particular officials and send the collection to the officials to impress them.
       There are also times when working as an “advocate” is more what Chinese journalists feel they must do rather than something they prefer to do. Journalists explained that these “must do” cases usually apply to interviews with high-ranking officials, such as leaders at the provincial or ministerial levels. One journalist offered an example:

Our colleague had got an exclusive written interview with the former provincial governor before he left office. But the interview protocol made by the journalist was ignored by the officers under the governor. Instead, they sent us a dialogue with their own questions and answers, which were mainly about the chronicle of economic development of the province during his term of office. But our newspaper published the whole dialogue. It was still an exclusive report, as provincial or ministry-level leaders rarely accept exclusive interview invitations from local news media.

Being advocates also means that journalists accept material rewards from officials, which is in conflict with the norms of professional journalism. Although journalists denied there had ever been “paid journalism”, all of them admitted they would not reject the “red packet” (hongbao, cash wrapped up in red paper), which is a “small amount” of money ranging between 100 to 1,000 Chinese yuan. This “small amount” of money is usually put in an official envelop of the related government department and given to journalists invited to press conferences or events organized by the authorities. Journalists simply identified whether it was “paid journalism” or not by judging the amount of money contained in the envelope and evaluating the intentions of the communication officers who gave them the money. One journalist told of how:

When you receive the communication package, you always check if there is a ‘thick’ envelope…if they obviously give you a big amount of money, especially when the money is supposed to be given to shut you up [after a negative event has happened] and to give you some instructions on [writing or not writing] specific content, you definitely cannot take it and should return the envelope. Most journalists react in this manner, and we report to our supervisors when this happens.

Another journalist took the red packet as an invitation made by the authority to ask for “promised” reporting: 

The red packet is nicknamed the “traffic allowance”. Only if it is not a “shut-up fee”, I personally believe that it is like the lucky money you get [from your friends and relatives] during the Chinese New Year. It is symbolic. You don’t get rich by receiving 200 yuan.

None of the journalists interviewed took the red packet issue seriously, as this seems to have become normal. They felt that it was the money that they “had to receive” rather than money they were “willing to take”. No journalist would reject the offer; otherwise, they would be taken as either “not willing to coordinate with the authority” or “planning to get on the authority’s back”. The immediate result of rejecting the money is that they will not be invited to the next press conference or event.
	Even when journalists do receive the red packet, however, they do not feel as though they are obliged to publish the positive news report. Yet they would try to write the news story as good as possible to get it published, which was a win-win situation for both the authority and journalist.
Journalists obviously take the opportunity to publish positive news stories about the authorities in order to trade such stories for more future access to news information, even sensitive information. Many told of how they had made use of the communications officer performance evaluation scheme of the government departments to maintain their relationship. As part of this scheme, government communication officers need a certain amount of positive news about their departments or leaders; in other words, they require the journalists’ help. Some journalists also told of how keeping such a relationship with politicians could also occasionally provide journalists with exclusive information about the authority and other politicians that could be used for critical reporting. They were hesitant to confirm that such information was released by politicians in order to denounce their political rivals within the system but admitted that the sources would request to remain anonymous in the news reports. 

Seizing the opportunities to be watchdogs. Working as political advocates is important, but news organizations would not survive in the market without also maintaining their watchdog role. As such, journalists cannot avoid doing negative reporting. For those beat journalists who already maintain proper relations with the authorities, it is important to seize the opportunities to do critical reporting, for example when the news is reported by journalists from other news organizations. Beat journalists can justify refraining from meeting the authority’s demand not to reprint or follow up on negative news: They are the ones bearing the responsibility of missing news that has been broken by their peers. Using this explanation, they can still keep their good relations with the authorities. More importantly, by following up on the negative news, journalists claim that they give the relevant government departments and officials opportunity to “clarify” and “tell the truth”, also a bonus opportunity for the journalists to improve their relations with the authorities. 
	For beat journalists experiencing difficulties of gaining access to the authorities, especially those who have just started working a new beat, seizing the opportunity to act as watchdog can open doors. New journalists attending the internal seminar at Paper S had expressed frustration about how some officials never invited them to press conferences and events, so they always wanted to “strike a small blow” via negative reporting. Their idea appeared to be supported by the experienced journalists, who had provided several examples of how that the strategy worked. 
	However the journalists emphasized that this strategy was only effective on the condition that journalists were denied access to the authority, even though they had tried the ordinary ways of relationship maintenance, including visiting the officers and sending gifts in major traditional festivals. “This may work once or twice but it shouldn’t be used all the time. After all, journalists have to be on the beat for a long time”, one journalist explained.
	Also, the strategy is not valid for journalists who are on the beat of several “highly important” party and government departments, for example the party committee and discipline inspection commission. Negative news about these departments cannot appear in the news outlet because the “chief editors and directors would care more about their rice bowl [their job]”. 

Reporting strategies for sensitive news

Journalists on beats other than the “highly important” party and government departments have much more autonomy with respect to reporting negative news, which is often sensitive news. They are also encouraged to cover sensitive news. “For a really good journalist, it is impossible not to do negative or sensitive reporting. If you only kiss the ass of the relevant authority, your supervisor will fire you”, one of them said. 
	Even though some authorities are more tolerant with respect to seeing negative news about them, they are still conservative when coming across “really big and negative news”; even more so are authorities with less experience in dealing with negative news. Thus, reporting more sensitive news is definitely detrimental to the journalist–authority relationship. Journalists may even be punished. The mildest punishment is being blacklisted from press conferences and organized events, while a heavy one might result in the loss of one’s job if the related government departments request that the state propaganda authority, the body supervising all news media, replace or fire a journalist.
Journalists do not seem to be afraid of being punished if the news they report is “really big and negative”. If the journalists and their supervisors expect that a sacrifice might pay off, they are willing to report stories that are sensitive enough to provoke sanctions. This is often because the journalists have proven that they are excellent journalists and will therefore have no problem finding another job in the media sector. Those who are denied access to the political information in one beat will typically be relocated within the news organization to cover another beat. Those who are ordered fired will be recommended another job at other news organizations. One of them explained how this works:

The worst for us is to lose the job and even the journalist license…but there are many examples of journalists losing their job because they did sensitive reporting – but are still working as journalists or commentators in disguise, using a pseudonym. Their real names can no longer appear in the news, as news organizations must be able to prove to the authority that they have respected the political order and fired the journalists in question. But as excellent journalists, they can still write for other news organizations under a fake name…

	The optimal situation for a journalist is to report on sensitive news while at the same time staying in the beat and not damaging their relationship with the authority. This is especially true when the news is not sensational enough for the media organization to run the risk of dishing out heavy punishment to a journalist. After all, the cost of developing a journalist to be a knowledgeable and professional reporter on another beat is high. 
       In fact, there are actually some journalists who have reported much sensitive, critical news yet continue their job on the beat without problems. These journalists are all considered to be the most experienced and professional beat journalists in the Chinese context. They manage to report sensitive news without provoking the “emotional resistance” of the officials. One such journalist revealed her talisman: “you have to step onto the place where they [the politicians] feel pain. If you cannot do it professionally, it would be a joke for them”. Another shared a similar insight, explaining that reporting sensitive news professionally wins respect from the authority.

Coordinating with both internal and external journalists. Acting professionally in such a complex context is always easier said than done, but a number of tactics could be easily operationalized by ordinary journalists. Journalists who have been on the beat for some time have relatively accurate judgment of how sensitive the news is and the risk they take when reporting the news. Most critical news stories are not risky to report, while some are. In these cases, journalists try avoiding the risks by making a reporting plan by coordinating with internal and external colleagues. These coordination plans include “sending out other colleagues to report while pretending not knowing about the news event”, “appearing on the scene but asking another journalist to join without noticing the authority”, “leaking information to colleagues to write the news story without signing themselves in the report” and “sharing information with journalists from other news organizations to co-share the risks”. Thus, while Western journalists favor breaking a big news solo, coordinated news breaking is often the only sensible strategy for Chinese journalists to report the news safely.
	These coordination plans vary, depending on the situation at hand. According to the journalists, it is not always a story of “the greater the sensitivity, the greater the risks”. If negative news is not too significant, the beat reporter will remain behind the scenes but ask their colleagues to go and report the news, fearing their presence would “harm the relationship on the beat”. But if it is explosive negative news exposed by other parties about which the government departments have no way to avoid being questioned, beat reporters will handle it themselves, because not only are they less likely to be punished, they are the ones who are more capable of writing a professional piece. Besides, since they have a better “personal relationship” with the officials at the related government department, they can obtain more exclusive information from the officials by “protecting them without pointing out the source”, as indicated earlier.
        Journalists will most likely remain behind the scenes when the news appears to be sensitive news yet far from being extremely sensitive. The interviewees all admit that they will either “emotionally” or “strategically” avoid reporting sensitive news due to the risk of being blacklisted, but there are also times when the they cannot judge whether the news breaking will be “really big and negative” or not. In these cases, two journalists will be sent to report the news, one making their presence known by engaging the authority, the other remaining in the crowd. In that manner, if one journalist is constrained by the authority, the other can still obtain exclusive information and write a good story. As one interviewee explained:

The purpose of doing this is to have one journalist distract the attention of the authority so that the other is free to obtain more news information in critical situations. In intense events, officials will keep a close eye on journalists. If we have another journalist who is disguised, they would have more freedom to report once the official is keeping the exposed journalist away from the negative news.

	More importantly, even if the disguised reporter comes back and writes an extremely sensitive or critical news story, the beat reporter can make an excuse by pretending not to know anything when the communications officer of the authority turn to them after the news is published. In so doing, beat reporters can maintain their relationship with the authority without being blacklisted from future press releases and events.
	If the news is not too sensitive and assumed to be tolerable to the authority, beat reporters make themselves co-authors of the news story. Once the news becomes too sensitive, they “would not have their names printed in the news reports”, even though they actually participate in the reporting of most sensitive news. 
	There are also situations in which beat journalists acquire exclusive and sensitive “materials” from the informants with whom they have developed a confidential relationship in the past. Some of these “materials” may be passed on to other journalists to follow, but once journalists feel that the news may become a sensation, enabling them to “achieve success and win recognition”, they definitely do the reporting themselves, even at the cost of being removed from the beat or even being fired.
In addition to internal coordination, external coordination between journalists and peers from other news organizations is also used by journalists to avoid being removed, fired or blacklisted by the authorities. As one journalist explained,

There is some massive negative news for which one news organization may not be able to carry all of the responsibilities by itself. If the news is an exclusive report by us, we might not be able to resist the pressure from the authority, so we may find a few other news organizations to do it together with. Thus, it is easier to resist the pressure if the risks are shared. When the news is reported by several news organizations together, the influence will be stronger. This is good for us, as it expands the boundaries of reporting.

	Another journalist revealed that some reporters from different news organizations working on the same beat have informal agreements about not doing exclusive news but instead sharing it with peers. In so doing, the journalists not only have others to co-share the risks with, they also avoid being criticized by their supervisors, who may not be happy if their subordinates “miss the report”. Moreover, the journalists can excuse themselves vis-à-vis the related government departments by saying that they have to report the news just like every other news organization.

Discussion
As demonstrated by the existing research on the influence of politicians on journalistic practices, our findings confirm that government officials have considerable power in holding and distributing political information. Chinese politicians not only can but do withhold political information to a much higher degree than in Western democratic settings. 
	The journalist–politician relationship in China is neither a “tango”, like its counterpart in Western democratic settings, nor a “puppet show”, as might otherwise be imagined. First, Chinese news organizations are permitted some measure of autonomy by the party state due to the media commercialization process. Second, Chinese politicians need positive news about themselves and the government departments they govern to move upwards to higher ranks. Journalists thus hold the chips when negotiating the boundaries for reporting with the politicians.
	Under such conditions, Chinese beat journalists are required to master the art of handling the relations with politicians. 	The strategies they use to maintain their relationships with the authorities are shown in their attempts to expand their news reporting boundaries, namely to gain more access to political information and publish more sensitive news, partly resonates with those used by investigative journalists, as summarized by Tong (2007) and Zhang (2008), but are just more sophisticated. The tactics used by investigative journalists, including writing objectively, avoiding the bottom line of the authority’s tolerance (Tong, 2007) and cooperating with peers from other news organizations (Zhang, 2008), are also used by beat journalists, but there are more tricks available for a beat reporter to do their job well. This is so because beat reporters must maintain a long-term relationship with the officials, whereas investigative journalists have no such need.
	Chinese beat journalists are in a comparatively weaker position when facing political power than their Western colleagues. They are neither comparable with those Swedish journalists who can lead the tango with the politicians in Strömbäck and Nord’s (2006) study, nor with those in Gans’ (1979, 2003) and Davis’ (2009) who at least can do a tango dance with the political sources. This necessitates them to “pull all the tricks”. In order to gain more access to political information, they have to serve as “opportunist facilitator”, just as those described by Weaver (1998). As those in Pan’s (2000) research, they have to please politicians with positive reporting and even accept material rewards, the “red packet”, from the authorities, both of which stand in strong contrast to the Western professional journalism to which many Chinese journalists claim to aspire. Being an advocate for certain politicians, beat journalists possibly also obtain some critical information about the authority or other politicians who are very likely rivals of the politicians they serve. The findings also suggest that Chinese journalists are not pure “opportunist facilitators”, instead using both “carrots and sticks”. For beat journalists who have already developed a close relationship with the authorities, there are good opportunities for them to be watchdogs when other journalists reveal negative news. Conversely, those without access to political information must seize the opportunities that present themselves to write critical news about the authorities in exchange for future access.
	In order to get more sensitive news published without being sanctioned or denounced by the authorities afterwards, most Chinese beat journalists will carry out coordination plans with colleagues, both from their own and other news organizations. The plans, including “sending out other colleagues to report while pretending not to know about the news event”, “appearing on the scene but asking another journalist to join without noticing the authority”, “leaking information to colleagues to write the news story without signing themselves in the report” and “sharing information with journalists from other news organizations to co-share the risks” serve to fulfill their responsibilities while at the same time avoid damaging the relationship with politicians and even being punished by the authorities. These findings are unique and again in sharp contrast with those from the Western context in which journalists would try their best to preserve a “scoop” for themselves; sharing it with an external journalist would be the last thing they would ever do.
	The findings suggest that the strategies do help expand the boundaries for reporting. These unique strategies are more than tips for young journalists; instead, they reflect the power relations between the political and media elites. Political elites are in an advantageous position in their relationship with the journalists and can therefore make the latter work the best for them, while the journalists have no other ways but to try those that can best work for the news media they serve. They are the “two-faced” journalists: in positive reporting, they generously pay compliments, whereas they want to “step heavily right where the authority feels pain” in negative reporting. While this might sound all too interesting to outsiders, it is only a “forced choice” for the Chinese journalists.
	In such an environment, there is no such thing as a “professional journalist” in the Western sense, but a real professional journalist in the eyes of Chinese journalists is someone who can “change faces” and work nicely with the strategies.
	When the public has a vague understanding of what a professional journalist is in the Chinese context, some real opportunists may emerge. Our interviewees were extremely skeptical of the journalists who try to make themselves well-known by triggering government sanctions. An example can be a journalist purposely exposing themselves in critical conflicts between the public and the local authority, portraying themselves as victims after being punished by the authority. A real professional journalist, as described by the interviewees, is someone who tries their best to protect themselves and does as much good reporting as possible.
	 With data from participatory observation in the newsroom and interviews with journalists, this research reveals more about the journalist–politician relationship and how beat reporters in China report the news. Further research may examine how the Chinese politicians use journalists to work the best for them, their strategies to control news reporting about them and their perception of the relations between themselves and the beat reporters, although these would be even more challenging research topics considering the access to the field. 
             When the approach of participatory observation can generate more unique and reliable data, it could cause validity problems without constant use of existing literature to verify the points of observation. Besides, researchers using anonymous sources are expected to make the data collection process as transparent as possible so that readers can have the chances of validating the empirical data.
             
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